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deductible also?  There seems to be no defensible reason for
treating the two situations differently so long as a
determinable life can be proved.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
ANNUITIES. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
had been receiving payments from a pension fund owned by
the debtor's former business. Fearful that the business might
terminate the pension payments, the debtor requested a lump
sum payment and purchased three annuities to provide for
retirement payments. The debtor claimed the annuities as
exempt under Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e) as payments made
on account of age. The court held that the pension plan
payments would have been eligible for the exemption;
therefore, the annuities purchased with the plan payments
were also eligible for the exemption. In re Caslavka, 179
B.R. 141 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors originally filed under
Chapter 11 and claimed their 59 acre ranch as an exempt
homestead. No objection to the exemption was filed. The
debtors then sold the ranch for cash and a note and
purchased another ranch for cash and a note, using the first
note as security for the second note. The case was then
converted to Chapter 7 and the trustee objected to the
exemption as to the second ranch and the proceeds of the
first ranch. The court held that the exemption was allowed
for the second ranch but held that, under Tex. Prop. Code §
41.001(c), the proceeds of the sale of the first ranch lost
their exempt status after six months unless reinvested in
exempt property. Because the first note was not "invested"
in the second ranch but was only used to secure the purchase
of the second ranch, the note was not eligible for the
exemption six months after the sale of the first ranch and
became estate property in the Chapter 7 case. In re Reed,
178 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . The debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided for
payment of several secured claims at an interest rate below
the contract rate of interest. The debtor did not provide any
evidence that the new interest rate matched a market rate for
similar loans, but the creditors provided evidence that the
market rate exceeded or at least matched the contract rate.
The court held that the plan could not be approved because
the creditors would not receive the present value of their
claims. In re DeSanto, 178 B.R. 634 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1994).
The debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of an
oversecured claim by payment of the claim over 10 years at
6 percent interest. The debtor calculated the interest rate by
determining the creditor's cost of lending and adding 1.54
percent "to insure confirmation." The creditor objected to
the plan and sought a market rate of interest for similar
loans. The court held that the interest rate would be the rate
for U.S. Treasury instruments with a maturity date closest to
the plan termination date. In re Smith, 178 B.R. 946
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 on January
19, 1994. The FmHA had filed a claim in the case for
prepetition debts of the debtor to the FmHA. The debtor had
participated in the 1993 disaster payment program, applying
for benefits in April 1993. The payments were not payable,
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however, until the end of 1993. The debtor made the final
application for benefits in March 1994. Although unable to
cite any statutory or regulatory support for the decision, the
court held that the CCC became obligated to make the
disaster payments to the debtor as of January 1, 1994;
therefore, the CCC debt existed prepetition. The debtor also
participated in the 1993 dairy refund program which
withheld money from the debtor's dairy sales checks and
would refund the money at the end of the year if the debtor's
1993 production was less than the 1992 production. The
court held that the refund amount arose as of the end of
1993; therefore, the refund was a prepetition debt to the
debtor. Thus, the court held that the FmHA claim, the CCC
disaster payments obligation and the dairy refund obligation
could be setoff by the government. In re Reed, 179 B.R.
353 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ABANDONMENT. The trustee sought abandonment of
the debtors' residence because the value of the residence
was less than the amount of the claims against the residence
and the sale of the residence would generate significant
taxable gain. The debtors objected to the abandonment for
the same reason, arguing that the taxable gains would
impede their fresh start. The court held that the requirements
for abandonment did not include consideration of the
income tax effect on the debtors and permitted the
abandonment. In re Johnston, 49 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 1995).
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The debtor
originally filed for Chapter 11 but converted the case to
Chapter 7 after two years.  The IRS filed a claim in the
Chapter 7 case for post-petition, preconversion taxes plus
interest and penalties.  The parties agreed that the taxes and
interest were entitled to administrative expense priority but
disagreed as to the penalties. The court held that under
Section 503(b), the penalties were entitled to the same
priority as the taxes to which the penalties applied.
However, the court applied Section 510(c)(1) and
subordinated the penalties to all other priority claims, thus
causing the penalties to be paid pro rata with other second
priority claims. The IRS had also filed a claim after the
claims bar date in the Chapter 7 case for additional taxes for
the same period. The court allowed the additional claim as
an amendment to the original timely filed claim because the
amendment related to the same type of tax and the same
taxable period. The court also subordinated the penalties
associated with the additional taxes. In re First Truck
Lines, Inc., 48 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g unrep. D.
Ct. dec. aff'g, 141 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
ALLOCATION OF PAYMENT OF TAXES. The IRS
had filed claims for taxes owed by the debtors for 1989,
1991, and 1992. The claims were secured by perfected tax
liens. The court had determined that the 1989 taxes were
dischargeable. However, when real property in the estate
was abandoned by the trustee and sold, a portion of the
proceeds was paid to the IRS which applied the funds to the
1989 tax debt. The proceeds were not designated as in
payment of any specific taxes. The court held that, because
there was no designation accompanying the payment and
because the tax liens would survive the bankruptcy case
even as to discharged tax claims, the IRS had the authority
to allocate the payment to the 1989 taxes. In re Cooper,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,234 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
AUTOMATIC STAY. Because of the debtor's failure to
timely pay employment taxes, the IRS assessed the debtor a
penalty prepetition. Post-petition the debtor filed for a
refund of income taxes which was granted by the IRS but
the IRS paid only the difference between the refund and the
assessed penalty without first obtaining relief from the
automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court had held that the
setoff of the penalty against the refunds violated the
automatic stay. The District Court reversed, holding that,
under Pettibone Corp. v. U.S., 34 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994),
the setoff was allowed without first obtaining relief from the
automatic stay because the IRS merely "netted" the two
claims in paying the refund. Query: Under this holding, can
any IRS post-petition setoff ever violate the automatic stay?
In re Midway Indus. Contractors, Inc., 178 B.R. 734
(N.D. Ill. 1995).
CLAIMS.  The IRS had filed a timely priority
unsecured claim for 1989 and 1990 taxes owed by the
debtors. One year after the bar date for filing claims, the IRS
filed a “supplemental” priority unsecured claim for 1988
taxes owed by the debtors. The court held that the late filed
claim would not be allowed as an amendment of the timely
filed claim because the untimely claim was for separate
taxable years. In re Chavis, 47 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1995),
aff'g, 160 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE.  The IRS filed a claim in the debtor’s
Chapter 11 case for unpaid taxes for 1977 through 1985
when the debtor filed accurate income tax returns but did
not pay the amounts due. The Bankruptcy Court held that
the taxes were dischargeable because the debtor filed
accurate returns and did nothing to prevent the IRS from
collecting the taxes, such as hiding assets. The District
Court reversed, holding that no fraudulent act need be
committed by the debtor in order to deny discharge under
Section 523. The court held that the debtor’s failure to pay
the taxes was a willful attempt to evade taxes because the
debtor knew the taxes were due and the debtor had the
ability to pay the taxes. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the knowing failure to pay taxes did not alone
constitute a willful attempt to evade taxes. In re Haas, 48
F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 173 B.R. 756 (S.D. Ala.
1993).
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on November 23, 1993.
The debtor filed the federal income tax returns for 1987,
1988 and 1989 by mailing the returns by Federal Express on
November 22, 1991 but the IRS did not receive the returns
until November 25, 1991. The court ruled that the returns
were not filed more than 2 years before the date of the
petition because returns delivered by private carriers are
considered filed when received by the IRS. In re Smith,
179 B.R. 66 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
JURISDICTION. The IRS had filed pre-petition tax
liens against the debtor's property. In the bankruptcy case,
the debtor claimed an exemption for pension benefits which
was allowed. After the case was closed, the debtor sought to
reopen the case to determine that the tax liens did not attach
to the exempt pension benefits. The court held that it had no
jurisdiction over the matter because resolution of the matter
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would not affect the bankruptcy estate or case. In re
Wesche, 178 B.R. 542 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
PLAN MODIFICATION. The debtor's Chapter 11 plan
was confirmed without objection by the IRS. The plan
provided for full payment of the IRS unsecured claim but no
interest during the plan. The debtor later filed for a
modification of the plan payments which did not affect the
amount of money to be received by the IRS on its claim.
The IRS objected to the modification because the IRS was
not receiving any interest on the delayed plan payments.
The court held that the IRS could not object to the
modification where the IRS claim was not affected by the
modification and the IRS had an opportunity to raise its
objection in the original plan confirmation hearing. In re
Eason, 178 B.R. 908 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994).
RETURNS. The debtor corporation had been forced
into bankruptcy by litigation over amounts due to it under
several construction contracts. The contract litigation was
still pending during the bankruptcy case. The litigation also
resulted in most of the corporation's records being
distributed to the litigation parties and the Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee had considerable difficulty in locating
the records. Thus, the trustee was unable to timely or
accurately file income tax returns. The IRS filed a claim for
taxes and assessed penalties for failure to file and pay the
taxes. The trustee sought abatement of the penalties. The
court held that the penalties would be abated because the
failure to file and pay the taxes was beyond the control of
the trustee due to the loss of the records in the contract
litigation. In re Molnick's, Inc., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,209 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on April 21,
1994. The IRS had a claim for taxes owed for 1984 through
1986. The debtor filed the 1993 federal income tax return in
August 1994 under a valid extension and claimed a refund.
The IRS sought permission to offset the refund against the
tax claim. The court held that the setoff was allowed
because the 1993 refund claim was considered to have
arisen in December 31, 1993 and not when the return was
filed. In re Firestone, 179 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1995).
CONTRACTS
LENDING AGREEMENTS. The defendants were
farmers who had borrowed operating funds from the
plaintiff over several years. When the defendants'
operational debt became substantial, the plaintiff requested
debt restructuring, including adding additional collateral for
the loans. The loan agreement stated that no loans would be
made for purchasing cattle and that future loans would be
made only if the farm produced a profit. When the farm
failed to produce a profit, the plaintiff refused to make any
additional loans, called the existing loans and brought
foreclosure proceedings. The defendants countered that the
loan agreement was invalid for lack of consideration, the
plaintiff had breached the contract by refusing to lend
additional operating funds, and the loan was not enforceable
because the defendants were induced by fraudulent
misrepresentations as to the intent of the plaintiff to
continue making operational loans. The court held that the
defendants did receive consideration for adding the
additional collateral in that the defendant continued to
receive operational funds for at least one year. The court
held that the plaintiff did not breach the loan agreement
because the plaintiff used acceptable accounting standards
in determining that the farm did not produce a profit. The
court also held that no misrepresentations were made
because the defendants knew that future loans were
contingent upon the farm making a profit. Production




AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 2.04[4].* The
EPA has adopted as final changes to the Worker Protection
Standard: (1) decrease to five the number of employment
days by which workers must be trained about pesticide
safety and require that untrained workers receive basic
pesticide safety information before entering a treated area,
(2) exempt qualified crop advisors from some of the
requirements for entering pesticide treated areas, (3) allow
early entry into pesticide treated areas for time sensitive
activities which require only limited contact, and (4) allow
workers to enter areas four hours after the areas have been
treated with lower risk pesticides. The EPA has also issued
an administrative exception decision to allow early entry
into pesticide treated areas to perform irrigation activities
under some restrictions. 60 Fed. Reg. 21944, 21948, 21953,
21955, 21960 (May 3, 1995).
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final the
change of Colorado from a Class A to Class Free state. 60
Fed. Reg. 24547 (May 9, 1995).
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM-ALM §
10.03[3][d].* The CFSA has issued interim regulations
which allow some CRP participants with a termination date
of not later than September 30, 1995 to request and receive
early release from their contracts without refund or penalty
if the acres are farmed according to a basic conservation
system for the remainder of the original contract. 60 Fed.
Reg. 22456 (May 8, 1995).
TOBACCO. The CCC has issued interim regulations
requiring tobacco producers to purchase crop insurance in
order to be eligible for tobacco program benefits. 60 Fed.
Reg. 21036 (May 1, 1995).
The CFSA has adopted as final regulations establishing
the 1995 crop national marketing quota for flue-cured (types
11-14) tobacco at 934.6 million pounds and the price
support level of 159.7 cents per pound. 60 Fed. Reg. 22460
(May 8, 1995).
RURAL HOUSING . The Rural Housing and
Community Development Service (the successor to the
FmHA as to rural housing loans) has issued proposed
regulations amending the requirements and procedures of
the Single Family Rural Housing loan program. 60 Fed.
Reg. 25629 (May 12, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
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CREDIT FOR STATE INHERITANCE TAXES.
Within three years of the decedent's death in 1986, the
decedent made several gifts. The estate made payments of
state inheritance tax on these gifts. The estate argued that it
was eligible for a credit for the state inheritance tax paid
because the donated property was includible in the gross
estate under I.R.C. § 2035(a). The court held that I.R.C. §
2035(d) made Section 2035(a) inapplicable to estates for
decedents who died after 1981; therefore, the gifts were not
included in the decedent's gross estate and no credit for state
inheritance tax on those gifts was allowed. Estate of Owen
v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 25 (1995).
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The taxpayer was a
remainder holder of a trust created in 1955. The taxpayer
would reach the age of majority in August 1995 and planned
to disclaim any interest in the trust by January 1996. The
IRS ruled that because the interest in the trust was created
before 1977, a disclaimer of the interest had to be made
within nine months after the creation of the interest unless
the interest holder has not reached the age of majority;
therefore, the disclaimer would be effective if made by the
taxpayer within nine months after reaching majority age.
Ltr. Rul. 9515034, Jan. 17, 1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* Eight irrevocable trusts were established by the
grantor in 1939 and no additions had been made to the trusts
since September 25, 1985. The trusts had lengthy and
restrictive trustee provisions which the current beneficiaries
wanted to change. A state court order was sought to modify
the trustee selection and qualification procedures. The
modifications did not affect the rights of any beneficiary,
although the beneficiaries did lose the right to voluntarily
become a co-trustee. The IRS ruled that the modifications
would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9515031,
Jan. 13, 1995.
The decedent created a trust for the decedent, the
decedent's children and the decedent's former spouse as part
of a divorce settlement. The children were the only
remaining beneficiaries and proposed to split the trust into
three trusts, one for each child.  The IRS ruled that the split
would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9515032,
Jan. 13, 1995.
The decedent's will created a trust for the decedent's two
children. The children proposed to split the trust into two
separate trusts, one for each child.  The IRS ruled that the
split would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9516052, Jan. 25, 1995.
The beneficiaries of four pre-1985 irrevocable trusts
obtained a state court order construing language in the trusts
that the beneficiaries of each trust had the power to change
the trustee of that trust. The beneficiaries of the trust shares
did remove the trustee and replaced the trustee with a bank
trustee located in another state, although the law of the
original situs of the trusts continued to apply to the trusts.
The IRS ruled that the judicial construction of the trusts and
the change of trustees did not subject the trusts to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9517025, Jan. 27, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent was a resident of a community property state and
the decedent's estate consisted entirely of community
property. The decedent's will provided for a bequest to the
surviving spouse of one-half of the decedent's "adjusted
gross estate" as defined by the Internal Revenue Code at the
time of the decedent's death. The IRS noted that only two
definitions were available, one under I.R.C. § 2056(c) which
excluded community property from the estate but which was
repealed when the decedent executed the will, and one
under I.R.C. § 6166 which included community property in
the gross estate. Even though Section 6166 did not apply to
the marital deduction, the IRS ruled that the Section 6166
definition was to be used because the decedent's will clearly
expressed an intent to fund the bequest to the surviving
spouse and the Section 6166 definition existed on the date
the will was executed. Ltr. Rul. 9516004, Dec. 24, 1994.
PENALTIES.  After the decedent's death, the executor
discovered several checks made out by the decedent as gifts
but which were not delivered to the donees. The estate did
not include the value of the checks in the valuation of the
decedent's bank accounts. The IRS assessed a deficiency
based on undervaluation of the bank accounts and assessed
an addition to tax for the undervaluation. The estate argued
that no addition to tax penalty could be assessed under
I.R.C. § 6660 because bank accounts were not subject to
valuation. The court held that the bank accounts were
property of the estate which were subject to the additions to
tax penalty. Estate of Owen v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 25
(1995).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent's
predeceased spouse's will created a trust for the decedent
with a remainder to the decedent's children. The decedent
was the trustee of the trust and had the power to distribute
principal to the decedent or other beneficiary if needed for
the decedent's support or maintenance. Under North
Carolina law, fiduciaries are prohibited from exercising the
power to distribute trust principal to themselves. The IRS
ruled that the decedent's power to distribute trust principal
was not a general power of appointment. Ltr. Rul. 9516051,
Jan. 24, 1995.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].  The
IRS has issued the 1995 list of average annual effective
interest rates charged on new loans by the Farm Credit Bank
system to be used in computing the value of real property
for special use valuation purposes:










Rev. Rul. 95-38, I.R.B. 1995-17, 12.
TAX LIEN. During the administration of the estate the
executor pledged estate property as security for loans used
to pay federal and state estate taxes. The loans were
eventually repaid with other loans and the collateral was
sold to third parties. Several years later, the IRS claimed a
lien on the sold properties based on unpaid estate taxes.
Under I.R.C. § 6324(a)(1), a federal estate tax lien is
divested as to property which is used to pay charges against
the estate and administrative expenses, if approved by a
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court of appropriate jurisdiction. Although the stipulated
facts recited that the estate property was used to pay estate
taxes under approval of a state probate court, the IRS argued
that the value of the property in excess of the loan amount
remained subject to the lien. The court held that partial
divestment was appropriate only if a portion of the loan
proceeds was used to pay charges and administrative
expenses, not if only a portion of the value of the property is
used as collateral. Therefore, the estate tax lien on the
properties was divested by the loan which was entirely used
to pay federal and state estate taxes. Before the appeal of the
case, the ten year period following attachment of the lien
elapsed. The appellate court held that I.R.C. § 6324(a)(1)
establishes a durational limitation on the lien such that the
lien becomes unenforceable after 10 years, whether or not
the IRS has begun enforcement proceedings before the
expiration of the lien; therefore, the appeal was mooted by
expiration of the lien. United States v. Davis, 95-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,193 (8th Cir. 1995), dismissing, 94-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,175 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].* The decedent had created a trust
funded with stock. The decedent executed a power of
attorney in the decedent's son, including the power to
withdraw property from the trust and to make gifts to
anyone. Within three years of the decedent's death, the son
withdrew 91 shares of stock and transferred them to the
decedent and then transferred the stock to the decedent's
spouse. The corporation duly recorded the transfers and
issued the stock in the decedent's name and then in the
spouse's name. The court held that the stock was not
included in the decedent's estate under 2035(d) because the
transfers were not a revocation of any right to amend or
revoke the trust as to the 91 shares. Estate of Frank v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-132.
Just over three years before death, the decedent executed
a power of attorney in favor of the decedent's son; however,
the power of attorney contained no power to make gifts of
the decedent's property. During the three years before the
decedent's death, the son made many gifts of $10,000 to
family members in an attempt to reduce the taxable estate of
the decedent. The court held that the gifts were included in
the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1)
because the son did not have written authority to make the
gifts and the gifts were, therefore, revocable by the
decedent. Townsend v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,192 (D. Neb. 1995).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent and spouse had created a
trust for their grandchildren and funded the trust with S
corporation stock. The decedent's daughter was appointed as
trustee and the trust provided the trustee with all powers
over the stock as an owner. The estate argued that the stock
was included in the decedent's estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)
because the decedent and daughter had an oral agreement
that the daughter would consult with the decedent before
making any votes as shareholder. The estate cited Rev. Rul.
80-346, 1980-2 C.B. 271 as authority. Although the IRS
acknowledged that the revenue ruling had similar facts, the
IRS ruled that the form of the transaction controlled and that
the decedent did not retain any control over the voting rights
of the stock so as to include the stock in the gross estate.
The IRS noted that the trust instrument was unambiguous as
to the powers conveyed to the trustee and that if the
decedent had intended to include the trust property in the
gross estate, it was a simple matter to add language to the
trust retaining power over the voting rights of the stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9515003, Dec. 23, 1994.
Prior to death, the decedent had owned 20 percent of the
stock of a corporation and, through voting trusts, the right to
vote all of the stock in the corporation. The decedent agreed
to sell all but one share of this stock to another unrelated
shareholder in exchange for a promissory note and an option
to repurchase the stock and the shareholder's own stock in
10 years. The decedent's voting rights were not altered by
the agreement. The option was transferred to a partnership
established by the decedent with the decedent's two children
as the other partners. Under the agreement, the remaining
balance on the promissory note could be used to offset the
option price. The children contributed promissory notes in
exchange for some of the decedent's partnership interests.
The notes were not due for 13 years and the decedent
systematically forgave payments on the notes each year.
Thus, after 10 years, the option to purchase the stock would
pass to the children without much, if any, payment by the
children. The IRS ruled that, although the sale of the stock
to the shareholder was a bona fide sale for consideration, the
effect of all of the transactions was the transfer of the
decedent's and the shareholder's stock to the children for no
consideration; therefore, because the decedent retained the
voting rights to the stock transferred to the children, the
stock was included in the decedent's gross estate. Ltr. Rul.
9518002, Jan. 23, 1995.
VALUATION. The decedent's predeceased spouse had
transferred 91 shares of a closely-held family corporation to
the decedent. The court rejected the estate's valuation of the
stock on three grounds. The court rejected the estate's
argument that a potential buyer would not pay more for the
stock than the amount of cash needed to purchase the
underlying corporate assets, the estate's comparable
properties were not sufficiently similar, and the estate failed
to include the value of management contracts held by the
corporation. A 20 percent minority discount was allowed as
was a 30 percent discount for lack of marketability. Estate
of Frank v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-132.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS . The taxpayer incurred
expenses for three parcels of real estate. The first parcel was
purchased with the intent to renovate and lease it to third
parties but the taxpayer used the building as an office for the
taxpayer's construction business.  The taxpayer was required
to capitalize the renovation costs because the property was
used in a trade or business. Title to the second property was
held by the taxpayer's sister but the taxpayer paid all
expenses and used the building as a residence; therefore, no
business deductions were allowed for that property. The
third property was rented to third parties. The taxpayer was
required to capitalize the renovation costs but could
currently deduct utility expenses. Perkins v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-189.
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SMALL BUSINESS STOCK-ALM § 7.02[2][b].* Under
existing regulations, an owner of Section 1244 stock could
not claim an ordinary loss deduction for the stock unless the
owner had filed an information statement with the tax return
for the tax year in which the loss deduction is claimed. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(e)-1(b); Magee v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-305. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
removing the information filing requirement; however, a
taxpayer claiming a Section 1244 ordinary loss is still
required to maintain records sufficient to establish that the
stock qualified as Section 1244 stock. 60 Fed. Reg. 20898
(April 28, 1995), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(e)-1.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayers were commercial salmon fishers
who reached a settlement with Exxon Corp. for damages
resulting from the Exxon Valdes oil spill. The court held
that the settlement proceeds were includible in the
taxpayers’ gross income because the proceeds did not
compensate the taxpayers for personal injuries.  The
appellate court affirmation is designated as not for
publication.  Every v. Comm’r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,229 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,478 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer was a
corporation which built and operated a shopping mall. In
order to construct the mall, the taxpayer had to have rather
mountainous land graded and shaped into a flat plateau. The
taxpayer included these land preparation costs in the
depreciation basis of the mall buildings but the IRS
disallowed the deduction as part of the nondepreciable land.
The taxpayer argued that the leveling costs were similar to
costs of foundation preparations because the buildings could
not be built without the leveling. The court held that the
leveling costs were nondepreciable land costs because the
leveling costs would not be reincurred if the mall was
rebuilt, repaired or replaced.  Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. U.S.,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,236 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. The IRS has
announced a program to educate businesses about the
requirements for reporting cash transactions in excess of
$10,000.  IR 95-37, May 3, 1995.
The IRS has announced a consolidation of regional and
district offices beginning in October 1995. IR 95-38, May
3, 1995.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. Under Rev. Rul.
84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157, the conversion of a general
partnership to a limited partnership did not alone result in
(1) recognition of gain or loss, (2) termination of the
partnership, (3) adjustment of the basis of a partnership
interest, (4) increase of a partner's basis by any deemed
contributions, (5) decrease of a partner's basis by any
deemed distributions, and (6) no change of holding periods
of partners' interests in the partnership. The IRS has ruled
that Rev. Rul. 84-51 applies to conversions of partnerships
to LLCs and LLCs to partnerships if the LLC is considered
a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 95-
37, I.R.B. 1995-17,10.
TERMINATION. A partnership was still subject to
administrative adjustment procedures because the
partnership had not terminated for federal income tax
purposes in the tax year involved. The partnership had not
performed a final accounting, the partners' capital accounts
were not brought to zero, and the partnership books showed
continuing partnership activity in the tax year involved.
Sirrine Building No. 1 v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-185.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. Members of one family
owned all the stock in two farm corporations, a C
corporation on the accrual method of accounting and
owning all land and equipment and an S corporation on the
cash method of accounting which leased the land and
equipment in operating the farm. The stockholders proposed
to merge the C corporation into the S corporation under an
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization. The resulting
corporation would be an S corporation entirely owned by
the family members with the same interests, holding periods
and bases as before the merger. The corporations combined
did not have more than $1 million in annual gross receipts
and the S corporation did not have more than $25 million in
annual gross receipts. The IRS ruled that the resulting
corporation would qualify for the exception of I.R.C. §
447(c)(1) and could elect to use the cash method of
accounting. Ltr. Rul. 9517009, Jan. 24, 1995.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
June 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.37 6.27 6.22 6.19
110% AFR 7.02 6.90 6.84 6.80
120% AFR 7.66 7.52 7.45 7.40
Mid-term
AFR 6.83 6.72 6.66 6.63
110% AFR 7.53 7.39 7.32 7.28
120% AFR 8.22 8.06 7.98 7.93
Long-term
AFR 7.31 7.18 7.12 7.07
110% AFR 8.06 7.90 7.82 7.77
120% AFR 8.81 8.62 8.53 8.47
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
POSTHOLE AUGER. The plaintiff was injured while
using a posthole auger owned by the plaintiff's relative. The
injuries resulted from the plaintiff's pant leg becoming
entangled in the power take off universal joint. The plaintiff
sued the seller of the auger under the Alabama Extended
Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. The seller presented
evidence that the auger was sold with a protective shield on
the joint which would have prevented the accident.
Although the evidence was inconclusive as to whether the
shield was in place during the accident, the court held that
summary judgment for the defendant was proper because
the plaintiff failed to rebut the evidence that the shield was
in place when the auger was sold. Kirk v. Garrett Ford
Tractor, Inc., 650 So.2d 865 (Ala. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Pittman v. U.S., 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. N.C. 1994)
(transfers with retained interests) see p. 30 supra.
Wesson v. U.S., 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 843
F. Supp. 1119 (D. Miss. 1994)  (court awards and






OWNERSHIP. The plaintiff claimed ownership of a
farm tractor in which the defendant claimed a security
interest through a security agreement covering farm
equipment owned by the plaintiff's son. The tractor was
purchased by the plaintiff using a tractor owned by the
plaintiff's son as downpayment. The tractor was delivered
to the son and the son gave the plaintiff a promissory note
for part of the purchase price. The plaintiff paid for about
half of the cost of the tractor. The son did pay off the note,
claimed the tractor as a personal asset on financial
statements, and claimed the depreciation deductions on
federal income tax returns. The court held that the plaintiff
did not retain any ownership interest in the tractor and did
not perfect any purchase money security interest in the
tractor by filing or possession; therefore, the tractor was
owned by the son and was subject to the defendant's
security interest. Melcher v. Bank of Madison, 529
N.W.2d 814 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
PERFECTION. As part of a debt workout, the
defendants had granted the  plaintiff a security interest in all
crops. The security agreement also granted a "contractual
possessory security interest" in the defendants' accounts
with the plaintiff bank. At the time the security agreement
was executed, the defendants' crops had been harvested and
were in storage. The defendants argued that the security
interest in the crops was invalid because it violated N.D.
Cent. Code § 35-05-04 which invalidated security
agreements in crops which also covered personal property,
the bank accounts. The court held that the statute did not
apply to crops which had been harvested at the time of the
execution of the security agreement. First State Bank v.
Moen Enterprises, 529 N.W.2d 887 (N.D. 1995).
WATER RIGHTS
TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS. The two
properties involved in this case were once owned by one
owner, with one tract used for a feedlot and having its own
water rights. The tracts were transferred several times with
one owner using the water rights to the feedlot parcel on the
other parcel. The two parcels were eventually sold to
separate owners, the defendant and plaintiff, with the
plaintiff suing for ownership of the water rights of the
feedlot parcel for use on the plaintiff's parcel. None of the
transfers of the plaintiff's parcel ever reserved the water
rights to the feedlot parcel and the court ruled that the
plaintiff's parcel did not include the water rights of the
feedlot parcel. The plaintiff argued that the use of the
feedlot water rights on the plaintiff's parcel by a previous
owner amounted to a transfer of the rights to the plaintiff's
parcel. The court held that water rights could not be
transferred by use alone because N.M. Stat. §§ 72-5-22, -23
govern transfers of water rights and the previous owners
never complied with the statute. McCasland v. Miskell,
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